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Article 3

ROOKER-FELDMAN, FROM THE GROUND UP
Barry Friedman &James E. Gaylord*
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE ROO ER-FELDMAATPROBLEM

How can we account for a rule that appears to be at the same
time both superfluous and extremely significant? That is the problem
presented by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.' On the one hand, it is undeniable that courts dismiss many cases for want ofjurisdiction on the
basis of this doctrine.2 On the other hand, commentators and courts
alike struggle to understand what it is that Rooker-Feldman adds to
3
other existing rules.
It is difficult to see what Rooker-Feldman contributes. Stated in the
most uncontroversial and minimal of ways, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear certain cases that
have their roots in state court litigation. 4 The problem is that other,
more well-developed doctrines appear to do the same thing. If a case
* The authors would like to thank Susan Bandes, Jack Beermann, Marla
Greenstein, Helen Hershkoff, Dan Meltzer, Richard Posner, Tom Rowe, and Suzanna
Sherry for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Tom Rowe deserves special
thanks for organizing the panel discussion at the Federal Courts Section of the
Association of American Law Schools' Annual Meeting 1999, of which this Article is a
part.
1 So named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
2 See, e.g., Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1993); Facio v. Jones, 929
F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1991).
3 See, e.g., Fuller v. Harding, 699 F. Supp. 64, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that
case could be dismissed alternatively on Rooker-Feldman or abstention grounds); Anderson v. Roszkowski, 681 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that case
could be dismissed alternatively on Rooker-Feldman or preclusion grounds); Gary
Thompson, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject MatterJurisdictionof FederalDistrict Courts, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 859, 861 (1990) (arguing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is unnecessary because its rationale is adequately served by principles of
preclusion and abstention).
4 See Edmonds v. Clarkson, 996 F. Supp. 541, 545 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("The RookerFeldman doctrine clearly establishes the rule that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims that have been adjudicated by state courts or that
are 'inextricably intertwined with the merits of a state court judgment.'") (quoting
Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 228 (4th Cir. 1997)).
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has been litigated to some point of finality in the state system, preclusion rules will bar relitigation of any issue that either was or could
have been raised in the state courts. 5 On the other hand, if state litigation is still ongoing, the federal courts will stay their hands on the
6
basis of the Younger doctrine.
It might be that there are gaps in the other doctrines that RookerFeldman plugs, but an attempt to explain Rooker-Feldman in this manner encounters some real difficulties. To name just one, exceptions
to other existing doctrines tend to be there for a reason. For example, preclusion rules will not bar a party from litigating in federal
court if that party did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
initially in state court.7 Rooker-Feldman might fill that gap, but the gap
exists precisely because the Due Process Clause 8 requires it. Minimal
concepts of fair play hold that parties cannot be bound to ajudgment
when they were unable to participate in the litigation in which it was
rendered.9 It is difficult to see Rooker-Feldman as prohibiting something due process requires.
The ordinary approach to determining the scope of a doctrine
like Rooker-Feldman would be to identify its rationale, then apply the
doctrine to cases as its rationale would suggest appropriate. However,
the Supreme Court has provided no clear understanding of what role
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is designed to play, and there is no consensus regarding the rule's purpose either among scholars or in the
lower courts. Thus, scholars struggle to find a role for Rooker-Feldman
among other jurisdictional doctrines with which it seems to overlap.' 0
5

See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (holding that federal

courts must give the same preclusive effect to state courtjudgments as would courts of
that state).
6 SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts should
abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings).
7 See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,482-85 (1982) (discussing
the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" exception to preclusion).
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
9 See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481 (finding that state proceedings must "satisfy the

minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law"). Of

course, resjudicata can sometimes apply even to nonparties. For example, the effects
of claim preclusion and collateral estoppel will extend to those who were not parties
to previous litigation but were "virtually represented" by such parties. See, eg., Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977). Such exceptions

comport with due process. Rooker-Feldman thus does no work in these cases either.
10 See, e.g., RicHARD H. FALLON ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1503-04 (4th ed. 1996) (inquiring what Rooker-Feldmanadds to the doctrine of
resjudicata and the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738); Suzanna Sherry,
Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE
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This Article is an attempt at something a little different: construction of the doctrine from the ground up. The idea we explore is
whether, beginning only with the most general understanding of the
Rooker-Feldman rule, we can identify what work the doctrine possibly
could do. If we can find some role for Rooker-Feldman, fine. If not,
perhaps it should be sent off to the junkyard of superfluous rules.
The analysis we employ proceeds in three steps, two of which are
quite simple. First, we set out a basic definition of when the RookerFeldman doctrine conceivably could apply, a definition we derive from
an examination of the primary cases." Accepting what is clear and
uncontroversial and rejecting the rest, we adopt this overinclusive definition: Rooker-Feldman might apply any time the lower federal courts
would hear certain cases that find their roots in prior or ongoing state
court litigation. Second, we set out two preconditions for identifying
12
what constitutes "work" sufficient to justify retaining the doctrine.
Those preconditions are that application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine must accomplish a result and further an interest that differs
from other doctrines, and that application of Rooker-Feldman in those
circumstances serves some purpose appropriate to the law of federal
jurisdiction. Part II of this Article addresses these two steps.
Part III of the Article then proceeds systematically to see if there
is any case in which Rooker-Feldman actually makes a difference. We
employ a methodology similar to that employed by Henry Hart in his
famous Dialogue on the power of Congress to control the jurisdiction
of the federal courts.' 3 Hart moved case-by-case through all the prototypical cases he could imagine, beginning with civil defendants, then
criminal defendants, and then proceeding to different types of plaintiffs. 1 4 In each case he sought to establish that Congress's power over
jurisdiction of the federal courts did not threaten substantive rights. 15
The effect of Rooker-Feldman, in contrast, is to deprive lower federal
courts ofjurisdiction in cases related in some fashion to prior or ongoing state litigation. We begin with cases in which the federal plaintiff
was not a party to the state court proceedings, then we move to cases
in which the federal plaintiff either was a party defendant or a party
plaintiff in state court, and conclude by looking at cases reviewing adDAME

L. Ritv. 1085 (1999) (seeking to determine the role Rooker-Feldmanplays among

other doctrines of federal jurisdiction).

11
12

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.

13 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 H v. L. REv. 1362 (1953).
14 See id.

15

See id.
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ministrative decisions. 16 Our central question in each prototypical
case is whether any interest is served by applying the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to bar the federal action that is not already served by another
doctrine.
Our conclusions are two, both quite surprising. First, we find that
Rooker-Feldman might properly perform a very small amount of work.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine might fill a gap in the Younger and preclusion doctrines in cases in which a party that initially had a choice to
litigate in federal court opts instead for state litigation, and then becomes disenchanted with that decision before the state court reaches
a final judgment. 17 In other words, Rooker-Feldman might do some
work only when a state court plaintiffjumps ship on a lower state court
proceeding (or the unfinished proceeding of the state's highest
court) .18 What is ironic is that it might do so only in the one place in
which the lower courts have deviated from the Rooker and Feldman decisions themselves. Both the rationale and the facts of Rooker and Feldman preclude review by the lower federal courts of the final decisions
of the states' highest courts, not the lower state courts. 19 Yet it is only
in this latter case that Rooker-Feldman does any work.
Second, the application of Rooker-Feldman in Feldman itself, and in
any case involving attorney admission or the discipline of a lawyer or
judge, is highly problematic. Because these cases typically arise in the
states' highest courts, no subsequent judicial review usually is available. 20 Rooker-Feldman is used to bar review in some of these cases in
the lower federal courts despite the fact that other doctrines might
not.2 1 Yet, it is precisely because these cases more properly are under-

stood as administrative proceedings (albeit before ajudicial tribunal),
rather than as true judicial proceedings, 22 that there is a legitimate
concern about the ability of the states' highest courts to perform their
regulatory function and provide appropriate judicial review. In many
cases there are allegations of bias or challenges to the disciplinary and

16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part III.C.1.
18 We say "might" because, as we explain infra notes 144-50 and accompanying
text, it is open to question whether such a federal plug is necessary.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
20 A writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court obviously is too rare
to be meaningful.
21 See, e.g., Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1993); Edmonds v. Clarkson,

996 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1998).
22

See infra text accompanying notes 200-203, 221.
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admission rules.2 3 Although these allegations may prove unfounded,

there is a sufficient basis for questioning whether a state's highest
court can provide the dispassionate resolution that ought to be required when no other judicial review commonly occurs. 24 Thus, for
the very reason that preclusion rules may not operate here, RookerFeldman should not either.
Our conclusions may be summarized simply: Feldmanitself should
be overruled. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be abolished.
Doubt should be cast on state supreme court management of the essentially regulatory function of licensing attorneys and disciplining attorneys andjudges. Finally, there might be a need for a new doctrine
to plug the small hole left by the Younger and preclusion doctrinesin other words, to bar state plaintiffs from jumping ship to federal
court in midstream if they become dissatisfied with state court
proceedings.
II.

PRECONDITIONS

We begin with the Rooker and Feldman decisions themselves, in
order to develop a broad definition of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's
potential scope. Then, we sketch out some basic rules to identify situations in which the doctrine might be said to justify itself-in other
words, to "do some work."
A.

A Basic Definition of Rooker-Feldman

The decisions in Rooker and Feldman are maddeningly elusive.

25
Prior to widespread reliance on the doctrines by the lower courts,

26
they might have been thought to have little germinal force. Rooker
was decided in 1923, and for the most part lay dormant for sixty
years. 27 Feldman28 addressed a quite specialized problem, federal review of state bar admission decisions. Yet, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

23 See, e.g., Leaf v. Supreme Court, 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1992) (concerning an
attorney who brought constitutional challenges to disciplinary procedures against
him and who claimed bias in prosecution).
24 See Guarino, 11 F.3d at 1159 n.4 (noting that "when a court makes a decision
concerning the legality of its own actions, it may be too biased to justify abstention by
the federal courts even if its actions are considered adjudicative").
25 See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1087-88 (noting that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
has "experienced explosive growth in the lower courts").
26

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

27 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1501 (stating that Rookerwas largely forgotten until 1980).
28 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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has grown to be something that sweeps far more broadly than these
two decisions.
From all that appears in Rooker,29 the issue was whether a federal
plaintiff could bring an action claiming constitutional error in a state
proceeding to which he was a party. The relevant part of the Court's
conclusion states, in toto:
If the constitutional questions stated in the bill [i.e. federal complaint] actually arose in the cause [i.e. state case], it was the province and duty of the state courts to decide them; and their decision,
whether right or wrong, was an exercise ofjurisdiction. If the decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely
left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely
appellate proceeding ....

Under the legislation of Congress, no

court of the United States other than this Court could entertain a
proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that
character. To do so would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original. 30
Rooker tells us some things, and leaves others in question. On the
one hand, the underlying principle is straightforward: from Rooker it
appears that issues that arise in a state case cannot be the subject of
subsequent litigation in an original federal action, but only may be
heard on direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The principle is
grounded in the respective grants of statutory jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts. 3 1 On the other hand, Rooker
fails to answer some basic questions such as: (a) whether the issues
32
actually must have been raised or litigated in the state proceeding;
(b) what it means precisely for an action in federal court to be one to
"reverse or modify thejudgment" of the state court;33 and (c) whether
it is only final decisions of the states' highest courts that are implicated by the jurisdictional bar.3 4 All these questions have proven
problematic.
29 The Court's opinion is brief and tells us little about the facts of the case.
30 Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16 (citation omitted).
31 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) (establishing Supreme Court jurisdiction to
review state court decisions), with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-66 (1994) (delineating the original jurisdiction of the district courts).
32 This question was subsequently answered by Feldman. See infra text accompanying notes 40-41.
33 See, e.g., Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1233-36
(5th Cir. 1981) (describing conflicting lines of authority as to whether Rooker's "modify a state court decision" language encompasses an action to enjoin a state court
injunction).
34 Compare In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Rooker-Feldman applies to decisions
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Feldman dealt with the question of whether bar admission decisions by the highest court of the District of Columbia-analogous to a
state's highest court-could be challenged on constitutional grounds
in federal district court 8 5 Echoing Rocker, the Feldman Court held
that this part of the federal action must be dismissed: "The District of
Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings. Review
of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court."3 6 The
Court went on to hold, however, that not every aspect of the federal

37
proceeding necessarily was barred by what occurred in state court.

The federal plaintiffs in Feldman complained not only about the application of the District of Columbia's bar admission waiver rules to their
specific case; they also challenged the general constitutional validity of
those rules.38 Adding another layer of analysis to the Rooker decision,
the Feldman Court concluded that although the federal plaintiffs
could not bring to federal district court any claim "inextricably intertwined" with the state court decision, they could bring their "general
attack" on the validity of the bar rules. 39
Feldman did answer one of the questions raised by Rooker, but it
confused the second (and left the third alone). Feldman made pretty
clear that the federal plaintiff cannot circumvent Rooke's jurisdictional rule simply by omitting or failing to bring the federal part of
the claim to state court.40 In other words, Rooker-Feldman will bar not
only federal issues actually raised in state courts, but also those inextricably intertwined issues that could have been raised there. 4 ' On the
of the states' lower courts), with Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyerland Co. (In re
Meyerland Co.), 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that a state
court decision was not "final" for Rooker-Feldman purposes because it did not issue
from the court of last resort).

35 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 463
(1983).
36 Id. at 476.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 468, 472.
39 Id at 486-87.
40 See id. at 484 n.16 ("By failing to raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may
forfeit his right to obtain review of the state-court decision in any federal court.").
41 Even on this point, however, the decision is not clear whether Rooker-Feldmanis
doing any independent work. This is because the Court, in its discussion of the doctrine, criticizes the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dasher v. Supreme Court, 658 F.2d 1045
(5th Cir. 1981), for thinking the bar on bringing appeals to the district courts only
applies to claims that were raised. In important language, the Court stated, "if the
constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's
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other hand, Feldman blurred the prohibition against a district court
"revers[ing] or modify[ing]" a state court 'judgment"42 by focusing,
43
not on the specific 'Judgment," but upon the state court's decision.
In addition, Feldman muddied more waters than it cleared. In
holding that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision on
the bar admission question was 'judicial" rather than "administrative,"
and thus barred by the relevant jurisdictional statute, 44 the Court reduced those terms almost to meaninglessness. After all, as Justice Stevens (referring to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals) pointed
out in dissent, "that court performed no more and no less than the
administrative function of a licensing board."45 The majority conceded that "the proceedings in both Feldman's case and Hickey's case
did not assume the form commonly associated with judicial proceedings."' 46 Having given away the heart of the case, the Court then provided only the following impenetrable explanation: "[The] form of
the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is
controlling." 47 The distinction between prohibited claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court action and "general attacks" that are permissible has proven impossibly difficult to
understand, as is apparent from the widespread confusion in the
48
lower courts.
To make matters worse, the one thing Rooker and Feldman did not

seem to say nonetheless has been adopted by virtually all lower courts
as an essential part of the doctrine, managing to destroy the only coherent rationale the doctrine might have had. The lower courts have
application for admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence being
called upon to review the state court decision." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. But

then the Court went on to state that simply because it might not have jurisdiction oveK
a claim not raised in state court did not mean the district court would, relying not on
the appellate rule it had just set out, but on other grounds, including preclusion
doctrines. See id.
42 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923).
43 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 (1983) (examining whether respondents' claims
required review of the D.C. Court of Appeals' decisions).
44 See id. at 480, 486.
45 Id. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

46 Id. at 482.
47 Id. See infra text accompanying notes 200-03, 220 for a discussion of this
issue.
48

Compare Lowrie v. Goldenhersch, 716 F.2d 401, 406-08 (7th Cir. 1983) (find-

ing no inextricable intertwining in disappointed bar applicant's complaint despite its

"purely personal" thrust), with Czura v. Supreme Court, 813 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that challenge to state's permanent disbarment rule was inextricably intertwined despite its broad framing). See also Sherry, supranote 10, at 1103-11 (discussing the confusion in the lower courts).
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overwhelmingly held that Rooker-Feldmanapplies to bar federal actions
following state lower court proceedings, in addition to cases filed following the proceedings of the states' highest court.49 If Rooker-Feldman
were nothing more than a rule based on the specific jurisdictional
statutes of the Supreme Court, it would make sense to prohibit "appeals" from decisions of the states' highest courts to the federal district courts on the ground that only the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over these matters. 50 But extending Rooker-Feldman to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction following activity in the states'
lower courts deprives the Rooker-Feldman doctrine of its rationale.
We thus are left with a confusing doctrine unsupported by any
rationale which nonetheless limits access to the federal courts. Meanwhile, the lower federal courts struggle-without much guidance
from the Supreme Court-to understand when a state proceeding is
'judicial, '5 1 what sort of action in federal court seeks to "revise or
modify" a state 'Judgment, '52 and to make sense out of the somewhat
impenetrable distinction between "general attacks" and claims that
55
are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court decisions.
Fortunately, in order to work from the bottom up, we need very
little in the way of a starting point. Stated in the most general terms,
as applied by the lower courts, Rooker-Feldman prohibits the lowerfederal
courts from hearing certain cases thatfind their basis in the same set offacts
that also provided the basisforpriorlitigationin the state courts. It obviously
is true that Rooker-Feldman does not prohibit hearing all of those cases,
as the "general attack" exception makes clear. 54 But, in order to find
where Rooker-Feldmandoes some work, we include more cases than the
doctrine may actually govern, in the expectation that these cases will
be weeded out as we proceed. What we want is a statement of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine that captures in some basic and uncontrover49 See, e.g., Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 165 (11th Cir. 1988); Phinizy v.
Alabama, 847 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1988); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805
F.2d 888, 893 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133,

1142-43 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd on othergrounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
50 Of course, federal review of cases decided by a state intermediate or lower
court or agency also might be barred under another doctrine. For example, the
Younger doctrine might do this work.
51 Compare Ktsanes v. Underwood, 552 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
state supreme court's denial of petition for exemption from bar admission rule was an
administrative rather than judicial act), with Grossgold v. Supreme Court, 557 F.2d
122 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that state supreme court's denial of petition for reconsideration of suspension from bar was both administrative and judicial).
52 See supra note 33.
53 See supra note 48.
54 See supra notes 37-39, 48 and accompanying text.
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sial way when it could conceivably apply. Overinclusiveness, rather
than underinclusiveness, is important at this point.
B.

Mhen Can It Be Said that Rooker-Feldman Has Bite?

Having arrived at a basic definition of Rooker-Feldman,we need to
find a way to identify those instances in which the doctrine is doing
some work. There are two essential preconditions that must be met
before Rooker-Feldman might be said to have bite; the first is simple to
define, the other more complicated. The first is that application of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine must actually dictate a result different
from that mandated by other doctrines and the interests that justify
them. The second is that this now-isolated Rooker-Feldman situation
must further another interest that is appropriate to the law of federal
jurisdiction.
Before turning to the two preconditions, a word is necessary regarding the structure of the law of federal jurisdiction. Very often
that law serves to allocate cases between state and federal courts. This
allocative function furthers various "interests" that justify exercising
state or federal jurisdiction. These interests are the proper motivation
for jurisdictional allocation, but courts and commentators often look
past them, fail to specify them carefully enough, or specify them at too
high a level of generality to be useful in solving the allocational problem. Thus, for example, it does little good to say a case should be in
state rather than federal court because of concerns about "federalism"
or "comity" because these terms are extremely broad and all-encompassing. On the other hand, it does make sense to discuss specific
interests, such as the poor incentives and burdens created by inviting
litigants to run to federal court if dissatisfied with the result in a prior
litigation.

55

The first precondition gets at this problem by avoiding doctrinal
redundancy with regard to both outcomes and interests. The precondition is an obvious one, but the following chart emphasizes what it is
we are after so as to avoid confusion.

55 Even here, however, it may be useful to dig more deeply and examine whether
the complaining party had any voice in the choice of forum. See infra Part III.C.2.
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Does Another Doctrine Bar
Federal Jurisdiction?

Does the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine Bar
Federal Juristiction?

No

Yes

No

Rooker-Feldman has
no impact.

Rooker-Feldman has
no impact.

Yes

Rooker-Feldman has
"bite."

Rooker-Feldman is
redundant.

What the chart shows is that we care about only those cases in
which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would deprive a federal court of
jurisdiction, and no other doctrine would. 56 If another doctrine
(such as preclusion or the Younger doctrine) would deprive the federal court of jurisdiction, Rooker-Feldman does no additional work. If
another doctrine would not serve to bar the federal court from proceeding, but neither would Rooker-Feldman, Rooker-Feldman does no
work. It is only when Rooker-Feldman prohibits federal litigation of a
case that otherwise would go forward that we can say the Rooker-Feldman doctrine potentially is doing any work.
As simple as this sounds, it sometimes will be necessary to examine closely the justification given for applying Rooker-Feldman in a
case in order to determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is doing independent work or is simply redundant of an existing doctrine.
Sometimes courts apply Rooker-Feldman and justify the result with reference to an interest that plainly is the interest to which another doctrine is directed. For example, if a federal court applies RookerFeldman because of the need to avoid duplication of work done in
state court, the federal court really is applying a preclusion doctrine.
This may or may not be the correct preclusion outcome, but the
57
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not doing any work.
The second precondition is slightly more complicated to explain,
but its goal is only to assure that when Rooker-Feldman serves to bar a
case from federal jurisdiction a legitimate reason exists for throwing
the case out of federal court. The first precondition narrows the pool
to those cases that are dismissed from federal court under the RookerFeldman doctrine, when otherwise they would stay. There are going to
56 Rooker-Feldmanby its nature never allows a case into federal court that is otherwise barred.
57 One might argue that this hypothetical is simply a case in which "federal" preclusion law is broader than state preclusion law. The Supreme Court, however, has
ruled out this result, holding that state preclusion rules govern in federal court. See
Allen v. McGurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
Rooker-Feldman might be a new name for an outcome prohibited by Supreme Court
doctrine, but we foreclose that possibility as illegitimate.
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be a fair number of these cases. What we need is some way we can try
to agree about right and wrong outcomes in these cases. The second
precondition asks whether the additional interest being asserted to
justify barring the claim under Rooker-Feldman when another doctrine
would not do so is one properly used to allocate cases between state
and federal court. Something like this precondition is essential to distinguish unacceptable outcomes from acceptable ones.
Once a case is identified in which no other doctrine is barring
the exercise of federal jurisdiction, but the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
might, the question is whether it is possible to identify a legitimate
interest that justifies that result. Legitimate interests are those that
serve tojustify the allocation of cases between federal and state courts.
Although often specified poorly, these sorts of interests are familiar to
federal jurisdiction scholars and to the judges deciding the cases. For
example, federal jurisdiction scholars would agree that excluding federal plaintiffs because they have red hair would not be acceptable. On
the other hand, even though scholars may disagree over the wisdom
of this policy or its application in individual cases, they likely would
agree that doctrines that avoid interference with ongoing state proceedings generally serve legitimate interests. If such an interest can
be identified, then perhaps the case is one in which the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine properly applies and does some work. If no such interest
presents itself, then perhaps courts are applying Rooker-Feldman to bar
cases from federal court when they should not be barred.
Summing up: what we are looking for is any instance in which the
general understanding of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would close the
doors of a federal court under circumstances in which those doors
otherwise would be open, but application of the Rooker-Feldmanjurisdictional bar can be said to further interests generally recognized as
appropriate by the law of federal jurisdiction. It is a two-step process.
First, look to see if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is reaching a different
result-in other words, throwing a case out of federal court that other
doctrines and the interests they serve would permit to remain there.
If such a case is found, the next step is to see whether any other interest can be identified which justifies allocating the case to state court.
If such an interest can be found, Rooker-Feldman is accomplishing
something that justifies its existence. If not, it's not.
III.

ROOKER-FELDMAA, SYSTEMATICALLY

It is the party structure of litigation that provides the most systematic way to analyze potential Rooker-Feldman problems. Rooker-Feldman
is always about barring the door to federal court to a federal plaintiff
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who was either a plaintiff, defendant, or nonparty in a prior state proceeding. Here we examine the different consequences for our basic
definition of Rooker-Feldman, depending on the party against whom
Rooker-Feldman is asserted in federal court. Some important distinctions receive virtually no attention in the lower court decisions. On
the other hand, most problems that appear to be Rooker-Feldman
problems are not.
A.

Absent Parties

One doctrinal area that appears superficially settled is that of federal plaintiffs who were not parties to the state court proceeding.
Most courts appear to have a blanket rule that Rooker-Feldmanwill not
bar a federal suit under these circumstances.5 8 Yet, despite this superficially clear rule, as Suzanna Sherry has observed, "lower courts
have .. .applied Rooker-Feldman even where the federal plaintiff was
not a party to the state proceedings .

. . ."59

In other words, despite

the existence of a blanket rule, some courts have barred seeming non60
parties from litigating in federal court.
As a general rule, however, Rooker-Feldmangenerally cannot bar a
federal case of a federal plaintiff who was not a party to the state court
proceeding. To hold otherwise would run afoul of the minimal requirements of due process. 61 Take the worst case, that of a federal
58 See, e.g., Bennettv. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[S]ince the
new plaintiffs were not parties to the state suit, their suit is not barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine."); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1092 (3d Cir. 1997) ("RookerFeldman does not bar individual constitutional claims by persons not parties to earlier
state court litigation.") (quoting Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 1992));
United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to bar a suit in federal court brought by a party that was not a
party in the preceding action in state court.").
59 Sherry, supra note 10, at 1112.
60 See, e.g., T.W. & M.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1997); Paul v. Dade
County, 419 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1969); Maszur v. Woodson, 932 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Va.
1996). Sherry uses this fact to support her theory that what matters for Rooker-Feldman
purposes is not the party status of the federal plaintiff, but whether the relief sought
would cause the federal court effectively to review a state court judgment.
61 As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court decided a case which
casts this point in high relief. In South CentralBell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, No. 972045, 1999 WL 152458 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1999), the Court held that due process prevented a state court from binding nonparties to a prior litigation, even though they
brought the same claims, were aware of the earlier action, and were represented by
the same lawyer. See id. at *3, *6; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
327 n.7 (1979) ("It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a
litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to
be heard.").
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plaintiff who was unable, despite best efforts, to participate in a state
court judgment that affected her. Due process would not permit
Rooker-Feldman to bar this suit.62 How then can lower courts be using
Rooker-Feldman to bar nonparty suits?
There is no need to tarry over this problem, because it turns out
on close examination that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not doing
any "work" in these nonparty cases. Any appearance to the contrary is
only because in some cases in which the federal courthouse is barred
to nonparties, it appears no other doctrine could be doing the work.
As Sherry observes, the fact that nonparties are involved would seem
to rule out the obvious other doctrinal principle that might apply, that
being preclusion. "Res judicata is designed to keep losers from relitigating. As such, it is largely limited to parties and those in privity with
them; individuals who have not participated in the original litigation
'63
can hardly be described as relitigating.
In all these apparent Rooker-Feldman cases, however, the real work
actually is being done by preclusion principles, and any state interest
implicated in these cases is precisely the same as that at stake in preclusion cases. In other words, whether the cases purport to be applying res judicata principles or not, that is effectively what is going on.
Because the federal plaintiffs appearto be nonparties, the cases are not
discussed in preclusion terms. But what each case really is about is
how far a state court can go to bar subsequent relitigation by a person
or entity who effectively should have been a party to the state proceeding or is an apparent privy of such a party. Stated one final way, all
these cases are about the state's interest in defining the party structure
of the original dispute in its courts, as well as the subsequent impact
that original litigation will have.
Perhaps the easiest case in which to see this is Hart v. Comerica

Bank.6 4 Basically, Comerica involved an attempt to relitigate in federal
court issues that were resolved in state court probate proceedings regarding administration of a trust.65 Both cases sought removal of trust

administrators because of alleged misconduct. 66 The federal plaintiffs
were not parties to the state court proceeding, and indeed some of
62

See ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 327 n.7. Sherry does not appear to be arguing

otherwise.
63 Sherry, supra note 10, at 1114. Sherry goes on to say that Rooker-Feldman is
"designed to keep the lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments,"
which she believes is fulfilled whether or not the federal plaintiff was a state court

party. Id.
64 957 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
65 See id. at 966-67.
66

See id. at 967.
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the federal defendants were not either. 67 The Comerica court noted
this and acknowledged the general rule that Rooker-Feldman could not
apply to nonparties, but applied Rooker-Feldman to bar the federal suit
68
anyway.
Despite the court's choice of doctrinal analysis, however, Comerica
was about a preclusion interest: the extent to which the state court
could compel participation at the original proceeding. The Comerica
court stated: "The instant Plaintiffs, as they conceded at the hearing,
were parties to the prior Wayne County Probate Court proceedings because they had the opportunity to intervene in those proceedings and doing
so was necessary to preserve their rights." 69 Of course, this statement

is a non sequitur. Nonparties cannot be "parties." Moreover, as the
Supreme Court aptly has observed, as a general matter, "[U] oinder as a
party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree." 70
The heart of Comerica was an implicit holding that despite the
general requirement ofjoinder as a party, Ohio did have a legitimate
interest in demanding that the absent parties participate in the original proceeding, 7 1 thus eliminating any due process problem with precluding absent parties. The state court in Comerica had provided
notice to the parties of what it was doing, and those parties chose not
to participate. 72 Had they done so, preclusion rules would have applied in the subsequent federal action. 73 The question in Comerica
effectively was whether a state could apply res judicata to bar a subsequent suit by plaintiffs who were welcome to participate in a probate
proceeding and who had adequate notice that their interests were being adjudicated. It also was effectively the question the court decided
(in the affirmative), despite the label the court put on the case.
Whether the federal plaintiffs had a right to skip the state litigation,
and then to litigate in federal court, is essentially a question of preclu67 See id. at 970-71.
68 See id. at 971-72.
69 Id. at 970-71 (emphasis added).
70 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989).
71 This is particularly true given that, as a probate action, Comerica was essentially
a proceeding in rem. Cf JACK H. FRiEDENTHAL ET A.L., rVIL PRoC-DURE 111 (2d ed.
1993) ("Because a court proceeding in rem adjudicates conflicting claims to local
property... due process does not require the court to summon, or even identify all
those whose interests might be affected by the judgment.").
72 See Comerica, 957 F. Supp. at 966-67.
73 See, e.g., Smith, Hinchman & Grills, Assocs. v. Tassic, 990 F.2d 256 (6th Cir.
1993) (applying Michigan preclusion law to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an
adverse state court decision in federal court).
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sion law and not one in which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does any
independent work. Stated differently, the interests at stake were preclusion interests and nothing more.
Of similar ilk are two other cases that appear at first blush to be
Rooker-Feldman nonparty cases, T.W & M.W. by Enk v. Brophy74 and
Allen v. Allen.75 Both cases were domestic relations cases of the sort
that generally the federal courts are reluctant to hear. 76 Enk v. Brophy
effectively was an attempt by a self-appointed federal guardian ad litem to challenge a state court custody decision by claiming that the
custodian appointed by the state court was sexually abusing the children. 77 The federal complaint accused the several state and private
defendants (acting in supposed concert) of violating the childrens'
constitutional rights. 7 8 In an opinion by Chief Judge Posner, the
court held that Rooker-Feldman barred the action. 79 Rooker-Feldmanwas
a secondary ground for decision, however: Judge Posner first concluded that the appropriate course of action in such a case was for the
purported federal guardian ad litem to go to state court to be appointed there before filing any federal suit. 80 Again, this case highlights that at bottom what was at stake was the question of who
properly was a party to the state court proceeding. Had all the proper
parties been present in the state court, preclusion rules would have
barred the federal suit and Rooker-Feldman would be irrelevant.8 ' In
fact, the putative plaintiff in federal court was the child, who was a
party in state court,8 2 so the Seventh Circuit's decision to require anyone else purporting to speak for the child to seek that permission in
state court was eminently sensible.
74 124 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1997).
75 48 F.3d 259 (7th Cir. 1995).
76 By way of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. Although
this exception does not apply to tort cases, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
704 (1992), ChiefJudge Posner pointed out in a later case that the fact that T. W. &
M.W. by Enk v. Brophy essentially involved a challenge to a custody decree brought it
within the "core" of the domestic relations exception. See Friedlander v. Friedlander,
149 F.3d 739, 740 (1998).
77 See Enk, 124 F.3d at 895.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 898.
80 See id. at 897.
81 See id. ("If the state court has the power under state law to appoint a guardian
ad litem in a federal suit but decides not to do so because it is satisfied that the

children are being adequately represented by their aunt or by the existing guardian
ad litem, that judgment would bind the federal district court as a matter of res
judicata.").

82

See id. at 895.
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To similar effect is Allen v. Allen, in which the biological father of
a child sued in federal court to challenge a state court decision awarding joint custody to the man who was the mother's husband at the
time the child was conceived. 83 The biological father subsequently
had married the mother, but at the time of the state custody hearing
he had not legitimated the child and could not participate. 84 The
federal court held Rooker-Feldman applied in an opinion that emphasizes the point being made here:
Had Allen followed prescribed state law procedures in establishing
his parentage, of course, he would have been a party in the underlying suit and would have been barred by Younger and Rooker-Feldman
from seeking review here. It would indeed be incongruous if Allen's failure to turn to his state court remedies gave him greater
85
rights than someone who had adhered to these procedures ....
In point of fact, had Allen properly been a party to the state court
proceeding, Preclusion doctrines (rather than Rooker-Feldman) properly
would have barred his subsequent suit, and it is those underlying preclusion interests that were being protected in Allen v. Allen. In neither
Enk nor Allen does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine really do any additional work.
One case of a slightly different nature serves to emphasize the
underlying preclusion interests at stake in these seeming Rooker-Feldman cases. In Bates v. Jones,8 6 federal plaintiffs sought to challenge the
constitutionality of California's term limits amendment for state legislators. Some, but not all, of the federal plaintiffs were parties to an
identical state court proceeding.8 7 The Ninth Circuit en banc majority avoided the Rooker-Feldman issue because it concluded that California state courts would not apply ordinary preclusion rules, but would
hear the case again under the state's "public interest" exception to
preclusion.8 8 Concurring and dissenting judges confronted the
Rooker-Feldmanissue, and-as one dissenting judge said-a concurring
judge apparently would have barred the suit based on Rooker-Feldman
"regardless of whether the parties before the federal court are differ'8 9
ent from the parties in the prior state court proceeding.
Bates was wrongly decided, but for reasons having nothing to do
with Rooker-Feldman. Rather, it was wrong because the most controver83
84

See Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 260 (7th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 261.

85

Id.

86
87

131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 845.

88

See id.

89

Id. at 861 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sial question-whether state preclusion law would permit relitigation-itself should have been decided by the state court. As the Bates
decisions make clear, this was an open question of state law.90 There
were means for asking the California Supreme Court this question,
including Pullman abstention and certification. 91 If that court had
held that relitigation was barred, then-yet again-the only question
remaining in the case would have been whether the additional plaintiffs in federal court were in privity with those in state court, itself a
preclusion question relating to the state's interest in determining the
scope of prior litigation. At bottom, Bateswas about the state's preclusion interest in the effect of its prior judgments, and application of
Rooker-Feldman does no extra work.
This discussion emphasizes the essential correctness of the
Supreme Court's conclusion in the important case of Allen v. McCurr 2 that state law should govern the application of preclusion rules
in federal court. The Allen v. McCurty majority's decision that state
law controlled preclusive effect, even in federal civil rights cases, was
not without challenge as undermining a federal interest in relitigation. More than one commentator has questioned why state law
should resolve this question, 93 especially with regard to § 1983 cases.
But Allen v. McCurry itself can be seen as simply identifying the correct
interest in such cases, that being how far state law does extend the
90 Compare id. at 845 (holding that California's public interest exception would
permit relitigation), with id. at 860 (Schroeder, J., dissenting in part) (contending
that the majority "incorrectly concludes that the California Supreme Court would apply a 'public interest' exception to permit relitigation").
91 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997) (endorsing
certification for novel, unsettled questions of state law, even if the standards for Pullman abstention were not met); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)
(noting that where there is doubt as to local law, resort to state certification procedure saves time, energy, and resources, and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (endorsing federal court
abstention on difficult, unsettled questions of state law).
92 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
93 See, e.g., Daan Braveman & Richard Goldsmith, Rules of Preclusionand Challenges
to OfficialAction: An Essay on Finality, Fairnessand Federalism,All Gone Awry, 39 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 599 (1988) (advocating case-by-case exceptions to preclusion as a matter of
federal law to achieve equitable results); Stephen B. Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A GeneralApproach, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 733 (1986) (arguing that a federal court should apply federal common law rules
of preclusion where a state court would be obligated to do so); William V. Luneberg,
The Opportunity to be Heard and the Doctrines of Preclusion:FederalLimits on State Law, 31
VILL. L. REV. 81 (1986) (advocating federal nonconstitutional limitations on state preclusion law in the intersystem context).
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effect of state court decisions. If the states do not care to attach
94
preclusive effect to certain judgments, why should federal courts?
Suzanna Sherry's alternative formulation of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine itself actually addresses preclusion interests, but too narrowly. Sherry argues that in cases like Bates, Rooker-Feldman ought not
to apply because the federal parties are not trying to overturn the
prior state judgment, strictly speaking.9 5 But the question to ask is
why would the state court in Bates care less about the preclusive effect
of the constitutional "decision" it rendered in the prior case than in
the 'Judgment" applying that decision to specific parties? What would
matter to the state in cases such as Bates is preserving the value of the
prior adjudication. Federal interests might justify denying the state its
wish-for example, if the federal parties could not participate in state
court, in violation of due process. 96 At bottom, however, the relevant
state interest is the relitigation interest.
Thus, in these nonparty cases, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
no additional work. If the case can proceed in federal court, that usually is because due process compels it. If the case is barred in federal
court despite the apparent nonparty status, that is in effectjust ajudgment about the permissible preclusive effect of the state court proceeding. At any rate, that is what should be the basis of the decision,
97
and Rooker-Feldman does no work in such cases.
94 Federal courts might have some other reason for not hearing the case, but it
cannot be to protect the sanctity of the state judgment. Whatever reason that might
be, the federal interest supporting it requires specification.
95 See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1115-16.
96 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
97 For this reason there is little point in pursuing a discussion of the many cases
in which the federal plaintiff sought to intervene in state court and, intervention having been denied, filed suit in federal court. If the federal court hears the case, it
usually is because due process requires it. If the federal court finds it cannot hear the
case, Rooker-Feldman also does no work. Either the federal plaintiff should have been
admitted in the state court proceeding, in which case the underlying issue must remain open to relitigation, see Marriot Int'l, Inc. v. Mitsui Trust & Banking Co., 13 F.
Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 (D. Haw. 1998) (noting that order barring unsuccessful intervenor from relitigating intervention motion in federal court on Rooker-Feldman
grounds did not prevent it from bringing an action on the underlying claim in the
future), or the federal plaintiff effectively had no interest in the state proceeding, in
which case federal standing likely will be lacking. The only interesting question is
whether the state court in fact litigated the intervenor interest question, and whether
that court's reasoning comports with federal law guarantees. See FOCUS v. Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 1996) (considering whether
unsuccessful intervenor at the state court level was barred by Rooker-Feldman from
making a constitutional challenge to the state court's gag order in federal court).
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PartiesDefendant

Existing doctrines generally bar state defendants from relitigating
in federal court. The Younger doctrine will bar most federal litigation
by state defendants in ongoing state proceedings. Assuming a full and
fair opportunity to litigate in state court, preclusion doctrines then
will serve to bar federal litigation following a final state judgment.
Thus, we can say as a general rule that state defendants do not get to
come to federal court.
In order to understand if there is any role for Rooker-Feldman in
defendant cases, it is necessary to consider why these parties defendant are denied access to federal courts. In the next Section, dealing
with state parties plaintiff, we will see that the case law accommodates
competing interests by permitting "involuntary" state plaintiffs to
(re)litigate federal claims in federal court. State parties defendant do
not have this opportunity, however. That is because in the case of
state parties defendant, the interests change in a significant way. The
primary difference is that the would-be federal plaintiff is accused of
engaging in conduct that violated state law. As such, the state's interest in pursuing the violator in its own courts tends to trump other
98
interests.
Of course, the federal bar is not universal and the state's interest
is not the same in all cases, providing some structure to our discussion
of defendants. First, the state's interest would seem to be highest in
its criminal law, somewhat lessened in matters of civil enforcement,
and less if not nonexistent in controversies between private parties.
Second, at least with regard to criminal matters, there is an opportunity for federal review in habeas corpus proceedings. Thus, it makes
sense at least to break out criminal from civil cases. What will be evident in both cases, however, is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
no work.
1.

Criminal Defendants

It is essential first to consider the treatment of criminal defendants, both because it establishes a baseline for the problem of state
defendants generally and because of the puzzle of habeas corpus. On
the one hand, a case of criminal violation implicates the state's most
98 This point is recognized in the literature, and some case law, but has not received widespread attention. See, e.g., Alleghany Corp. v. Haase, 896 F.2d 1046, 1050
(7th Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom. Dillon v. Alleghany Corp., 499 U.S. 933 (1991); Paul
M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation,22 WM. & MARY L. REv.
605, 620-21 (1981); Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV.
530, 560-63 (1989).
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serious interests, which would justify a hands-off approach by federal
courts to state litigation. On the other hand, the availability of habeas
corpus provides the most significant source of relitigation in our dual
court system. Habeas permits former state court defendants to raise
in federal court any federal (mostly constitutional) claim they actually
litigated in state court,99 and in rare instances claims that they were
barred from litigating. 10 0 The only requirement is that the claim be
exhausted in state court before coming to federal court.1 1
Some courts say that habeas is an "exception" to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but this is a peculiar formulation that serves to confuse
the correct outcome in actual cases.' 0 2 Rooker and Feldman rest on the
notion that relevant jurisdictional statutes implictly vest jurisdiction
over appeals from the state courts solely in the Supreme Court.'0 3 Because habeas jurisdiction finds its roots in statute, if forced one might
say, "Rooker-Feldman is implicitly derived from the jurisdictional statutes, but the habeas statute is an explicit jurisdictional exception to
that implicit rule." This statement is pretty awkward, made only more
so by the fact that Congress has tended to follow the Supreme Court
as to the scope of habeas jurisdiction. 10 4 In any event, it is unclear
why, if habeas is an "exception" to Rooker-Feldman, other statutes
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994) (stating that court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
100 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977) (holding that a habeas court
can hear a claim that the petitioner is barred from raising in state court because of a
failure to comply with a state procedural rule upon a "showing of cause for the noncompliance and some showing of actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation"); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (noting that
"where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a
showing of cause for procedural default").
101 See 28 U.S.CA. § 2254(b) (1) (A) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring that applicant
for the writ exhaust the remedies available in state court).
102 See, e.g., Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[H]abeas
corpus . . . is an exception to the general principle of Rooker-Feldman."); Blake v.
Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992) ("The habeas corpus jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts is a constitutionally authorized exception to the principle of
Rooker-Feldman.").
103 See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
104 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1455 (noting that Congress has not significantly modified the habeas statute, while the Supreme Court has "dramatically reshaped the writ"); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress,
and FederalJurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 13 (1990) (explaining how Congress generally follows the Supreme Court's interpretation of the habeas statute).
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(§ 1983105 cases come to mind, if not those under the general federal
question statute'0 6 ) are not. This is the basis for Susan Bandes's argument that there is no sound jurisdictional basis for the Rooker-Feldman
107
doctrine.
The bottom-up approach suggests what the structure of habeas
itself confirms: habeas is an exception to preclusionrules' 0 8 and RookerFeldman actually plays no role in these cases at all. Habeas doctrine
seems designed precisely to address preclusion issues. The structure
of habeas law is that federal claims cannot be considered until a final
state judgment is rendered. 10 9 The habeas statute and judicial doctrine then spell out in some specificity what preclusive effect state law
determinations and fact findings have in federal court. 110 Contrast
habeas to other federal jurisdictional grants: in most other federal
cases, there is no exhaustion requirement but preclusion rules apply;
habeas is the opposite, requiring exhaustion but then effectively waiving preclusion in specified ways. 1 ' Thus, habeas is about preclusion,
not Rooker-Feldman.
The interests at stake in habeas cases support this preclusion understanding of the doctrine. The state has an interest in pursuing
enforcement in its own courts. 112 The federal interest is in federal
litigation of important rights." 3 Under the state criminal trial/fed105 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
106 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
107 See Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: EvaluatingItsJurisdictionalStatus, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1175 (1999).
108 See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512
(1982) ("The writ of habeas corpus is a major exception to the doctrine of resjudicata, as it allows relitigation of a final state-court judgment disposing of precisely the
same claims.").
109 See supra note 99.
110 See, eg., 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2254(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1998) (stating that state court
adjudications are reviewed for unreasonable application of federal law, but that determinations of fact are presumed correct); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985)
(holding that mixed questions of fact and law are subject to plenary federal review).
111 Compare habeas sources cited supra notes 99-101, with Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90 (1980) (holding that res judicata applies to § 1983 actions), and Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983
actions).
112 See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (noting that the state's
interest in its enforcement proceedings "are so important that exercise of the federal
judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government");Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (holding that state's interest in its
contempt process is important enough to warrant abstention).
113 See LARRY W. YAcKm , RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 159-60 (1994) (noting
that "citizens subject to criminal prosecutions in state court should have an opportunity to raise any federal claims they may have in federal court," and the purpose of the
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eral habeas model, both sets of interests are accommodated. The
state gets first crack at the defendant, fulfilling its enforcement interests, but then federal claims are reserved for litigation in federal
court.'1

4

Moreover, the integrity of state processes is respected (i.e.,

there is deference on facts and state law questions) so long as those
processes comported with constitutional due process." 5
Continuing to believe that Rooker-Feldman plays any role in state
criminal defendant cases serves only to confuse courts and distract
them from the right issues. Thus, in Dubinka v. Judges of Superior
Court,1 1 6 the federal court was faced with an action by three criminal
defendants who (while their cases were pending in state court) filed a
federal action challenging the California ballot initiative that altered
criminal discovery rules. The federal court held that Rooker-Feldman
did not apply because the claims were "general" claims under Feldman,
but nonetheless went on to dismiss the action based on the Younger
doctrine." 7 No harm was done in Dubinka, because Younger in fact
governed the case: the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine simply did no work. In
the face of ongoing state criminal proceedings, Younger bars the exercise of federal jurisdiction. But the Dubinka court's analysis on RookerFeldman grounds creates the misleading impression that the defendants could possibly have obtained federal jurisdiction simply by not
raising their claims in state court (because they were separate from
the state courtjudgment and thus a "general" challenge). Yet, just the
opposite is correct: habeas would waive ordinary preclusion rules only
so long as the defendants did raise their claims as part of the state
proceeding." 8 Under the governing structure of the law, the claims
about the California referendum properly were part of the state criminal case, subject to subsequent habeas litigation. Thus preclusion and
writ is "to vindicate federal rights in federal court"); Stephanie Dest, Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus and State ProceduralDefault: An Abstention-BasedInterest Analysis, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 263, 291 (1989) ("The substantive federal interest involved in the federal

review of habeas corpus claims lies independently in the vindication of civil and constitutional rights in a federal forum.").
114 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
115 See Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 1040
(1985) (remarking that habeas "places the construction and implementation of criminal law policy with state authorities but assigns the enforcement of federal procedural
safeguards owed to the accused to the federal courts"); cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.

293, 312 (1963) (holding that a habeas court will hold an evidentiary hearing where
the applicant did not receive a full and fair hearing in state court).
116 23 F.3d 218 (9th Cir. 1994).

117 See id. at 222.
118

See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
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habeas corpus rules (not discussed by the Dubinka court), and not
Rooker-Feldman, were the key to resolving the case.
Similarly, Plyler v. Moore119 is a case in which Rooker-Feldman
played a starring role but should have played no role. In Plyler, state
prisoners filed a class action in federal court claiming that the South
Carolina legislature's amendment of a mandatory furlough program
was an unconstitutional ex post facto law.1 20 The federal court
reached the merits and ruled-arguably correctly-that the South
Carolina statute was unconstitutional. 12 1 The difficult question in the
case was whether the federal court should have reached the merits at
all. The inmates had filed a prior suit in South Carolina state court to
obtain a clarification of the meaning of the amending statute. 122 In
1 23
the course of that case the ex post facto issue arguably was litigated.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that it could hear the case be124
cause of the so-called habeas exception to Rooker-Feldman.
Rooker-Feldman did no work at all in Plyler and could have served
as a basis for confusing the issues. The only real issue in Plyler was
whether the inmates' federal suit properly was brought under habeas
jurisdiction or § 1983. If the former, the exhaustion/no-preclusion
model would permit relitigation. If the latter, litigation in state court
would have barred the action under Allen v. McCury 1 25 and preclusion law. Plyler presented only preclusion and habeas corpus questions. Once Rooker-Feldman is taken out of the picture, it is apparent
the Plyler plaintiffs would have been much safer had they gone to federal court first, in order to avoid guessing incorrectly which model
applied.
In sum, Rooker-Feldman does no work in criminal defense cases.
While those cases are ongoing, the Younger doctrine supports state interests in noninterference with state proceedings. After they are complete, preclusion would apply, but habeas corpus protects federal
interests by waiving preclusion in order to protect substantive and procedural claims. Habeas-a waiver of preclusion-defines the waterfront, eliminating any role for Rooker-Feldman. Habeas protects state
interests by not waiving preclusion for unexhausted claims, defaulted
claims, and the ultimate question of whether state law was violated;
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

129 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 730.
See id. at 736.
See id. at 729-30.
See id. at 731.
See id. at 733.
449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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federal interests are served by permitting the relitigation of other federal claims.
2.

Civil Defendants, Both Enforcement and Private

Because there is no habeas available following civil cases, the
analysis is even simpler, although it does highlight some incongruity
in the doctrine. Rooker-Feldman does no work in those cases. Younger
bars federal claims during ongoing state proceedings; preclusion doctrines deal with final state judgments. The only interesting problems
involve figuring out why the lower courts get confused, and why civil
defendants do not get the same treatment as criminal defendants.
That Rooker-Feldmandoes no work is evident in a case in which the
Tenth Circuit thought it might. In Kiowa Indian Tribe v. Hoover,126 the
Tribe had been sued in state court in two cases and had judgment
entered against it, after which followed a number of enforcement actions to obtain payment of the judgment. The Kiowa Tribe came to
federal court seeking a declaration that under federal law it was immune from suit in state court and an injunction against further litigation of state law contract claims or enforcement of the state
judgments. 12 7 The problem was that the Tribe had raised the immunity defense in state court and litigated it at least twice to final decision in the state supreme court; one enforcement proceeding was
ongoing in the intermediate state courts, and the defense had been
28
asserted there as well.1
Although it is easy to see why the Kiowa court wanted to reach the
merits, its decision that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the federal action
was somewhat implausible. On the merits, it was apparent by the time
the case reached the Court of Appeals that the Kiowa Tribe should
prevail, because the Supreme Court of the United States had held as
much in another case involving the same tribe. 129 Thus, it looked like
the state courts were playing fast and loose with tribal immunity, and
the federal court understandably was anxious to right an evident
wrong. In order to do that, however, the Tenth Circuit somehow concluded that the claims the Kiowa Tribe brought to federal court,
which had been litigated three times in state court, were not "inextricably intertwined" with the state court decisions. 3 0° It is tough to
126

150 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 1998).

127 See id. at 1165.
128 See id. at 1165-69.
129 See Kiowa Indian Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700 (1998)
(holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred suits in contract against the Tribe).
130 See Kiowa Indian Tribe, 150 F.3d at 1171.
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know what to say about the Rooker-Feldmanpart of that court's decision
except that, again, it was understandable why the Court of Appeals
wanted to reach the merits.
The problem is that, Rooker-Feldman or no Rooker-Feldman, the Kiowa court should not have reached the merits; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine just does not add much here. It is difficult to see why preclusion
doctrines would not bar relitigating immunity issues litigated to final
decision in a state supreme court. And Youngerwould bar litigating an
immunity defense currently being addressed by the state intermediate
courts in an enforcement proceeding. The state might default in raising the preclusion claims, but short of that, the case ought not to go
forward.
The same was true in Facio v. Jones.13 1 In Facio, the state defendant was sued over a debt arising from a bounced check. 132 The defendant defaulted, thinking the controversy had been settled with a
money order. 133 When the default judgment was entered in state
court, the defendant sought to reopen the judgment, which the state
court refused to do, holding that state law first required presentation
of a meritorious defense.1 34 The state defendant then filed suit in
federal court arguing that the state rule was unconstitutional.135 The
Facio court decided the case on Rooker-Feldman grounds, 13 6 when in
reality the case was one of preclusion. If Facio thought the state court
rule was unconstitutional, he should have appealed the dismissal of
his suit in the state courts. Upon failing to appeal, and the time to do
so having run, preclusion law surely barred Facio's claim.
There is the nontrivial problem looming of how to distinguish
criminal from civil defendants. Kiowa Tribe essentially was a substantive defense to the state action, arguing that liability was not permissible under federal law. Facio raised a procedural challenge, arguing
that the adjudicatory mechanism in state court violated the Constitution. If the defendants in Kiowa Tribe or Facio had been criminal defendants, they would have been able to litigate both these types of
137
claims in federal court under habeas.
131 929 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1991).
132 See id. at 542.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 542-43.
136 See id. at 545.
137 The state interest argument for prior litigation in state court assumes the defendant violated state law. This interest suggests distinguishing between substantive

and procedural challenges to the state court proceeding. As to the former, if the
defendant refrains from violating the state law, he could bring an "anticipatory ac-
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As difficult as the problem is, however, the question is not one
likely to be resolved by the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine. The difference in
treatment may be inappropriate; on the other hand, it could rest on
some understanding of the special status of habeas.1 3 8 But Rooker-Feldman serves only to force cases out of federal court, it does not serve to
open the federal court doors. Thus, Rooker-Feldman cannot do any
work with regard to civil defendants that is not already done by the
Younger and preclusion doctrines.
C.

PartiesPlaintiff

It would seem at first blush that the easiest of the Rooker-Feldman
cases are those involving state court plaintiffs. After all, the state
plaintiff chose the initial forum. Subsequent dissatisfaction with that
choice is unlikely to impress anyone as a good reason for permitting a
federal court suit. More important, so long as the plaintiff in state
court was permitted a full and fair opportunity to litigate her case,
there is no apparent federal interest that justifies another suit in federal court. On the other hand, the state plainly has an interest in not
having judicial proceedings interrupted or taken for naught once they
have begun.
1. Voluntary Plaintiffs
As it turns out, the state's interest is such that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine might actually do some work in federal suits brought by state
plaintiffs. This is because existing doctrines do not necessarily bar all
federal suits in situations where the state interest suggests there
should not be federal litigation. Unlike a state defendant, an unhappy state plaintiff could abandon the state suit, so that there would
be no ongoing action to which the federal court would defer under
the Younger doctrine. Preclusion doctrines might not bar a federal
action if the state action itself is not final. 139 Yet, there is a state interion" in federal court asking whether the conduct made illegal by state law nonetheless was protected under federal law. Procedural challenges, however, both arise in
the course of state proceedings (including investigation), and may go to whether the
litigation in state court presented a full and fair opportunity to defend. Thus, in the
subsequent federal action, the defendant could not raise the state law issue of actual
guilt, but only constitutional protection for the conduct (a substantive defense) or
procedural irregularity.
138 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Pas de Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts,

66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2467 (1993) (offering justification for increased federal review in
habeas cases).
139 That, incidentally, is a question of state law, and under state law preclusion
might well serve to bar a federal action even before the state case goes to the highest
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est in protecting the value of work done by its courts, as well as an
interest in stopping parties from toying with state courts by filing suits
then dismissing them if things do not go as they wish. Thus, RookerFeldman might do some work if the state plaintiff had engaged in substandal litigation in the lower state court and then grew dissatisfied
140
before any judgment was reached.
The central point of the state plaintiff story is that parties with a
choice of forum ordinarily should be bound by that choice. Ironically, an excellent demonstration of the principle at stake here comes
in a case involving not a state plaintiff, but a state defendant who
could have removed the case to federal court and chose not to do so.
In South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. Zobel,141 the state plaintiff,
the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, sought and obtained an order permitting it to march in a parade. The defendants
became dissatisfied with the progress of the state court action and
filed their own action in federal court arguing that to permit the
march would violate their constitutional rights. 142 The parties defendant in state court could have removed the case to federal court initially but did not do so, and the time to remove had run out.14 3 The
federal district court held that Rooker-Feldman barred the federal action, stating that it was irrelevant that the state decision from which
the federal plaintiffs sought relief was "preliminary in nature." 4 4 This
is precisely the point applicable in most plaintiff cases: having had an
opportunity to come to federal court and chosen to proceed in state
court, a plaintiff cannot bring a subsequent federal action based on
dissatisfaction with the state proceeding. If no other doctrine would
serve to bar such proceeding-and that may well be the case when
state proceedings are "preliminary"-then Rooker-Feldman serves a
purpose.
The difficult question is whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
should work to deprive these voluntary plaintiffs of access to federal
court if state preclusion law would not do so. Some federal jurisdicstate court, so long as there is a lower courtjudgment. If not, however, Rooker-Feldman
will play a role.
140 Note that the state's interest in these latter situations is not precisely the same
as that furthered by preclusion doctrines: those doctrines protect the state's interest
in the sanctity ofjudgments, while the Rooker-Feldman doctrine serves a state's interest
in not wasting its judicial resources even if there is no final judgment at stake.
141 830 F. Supp. 643 (D. Mass. 1993).
142 See id. at 644.
143 See id. at 644-45.
144 The district court also held that Youngerabstention applied, which may be correct. See id. at 651. If so, Rooker-Feldman is not doing any independent work in this
case.
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tional doctrines exist precisely to address situations in which state law
may not take into account the peculiarities of parallel federal and
state judicial systems. State law deals with intra-jurisdictional
problems, but may not account for interjurisdictional problems.
Thus, we can rely on state law to solve preclusion problems: these
problems are present within the state court system and the same interest-balancing that determines the outcome in state court ought also to
apply if the problems arise in a new court system. But doctrines like
Younger developed precisely because state law typically has no analog
that could be used to determine whether federal proceedings can and
should disrupt those ongoing in sister state courts.
The precise issue with regard to applying Rooker-Feldman to state
plaintiffs is whether state intrajurisdictional preclusion law is sufficient
to address the relative state and federal interests, or whether a separate federal doctrine is necessary. An argument can be made that if
state jurisdictional law does not bar the voluntary plaintiff from proceeding anew in state court, federal law should not be any different.
If so, Rooker-Feldman again does no work.
Nonetheless, as Chan Tse Ming v. Cordis Corp.145 demonstrates,

there may well be room for a federal doctrine that addresses the special interjurisdictional problem of the voluntary state plaintiff who dismisses the state suit and jumps ship to federal court. In Chan Tse
Ming, a Hong Kong plaintiff sued a Florida pacemaker manufacturer
for products liability in Florida state court.' 46 The state court ruled
that the law of Hong Kong would apply to the action.' 47 Perhaps because Hong Kong has less liberal products liability law than the
United States, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action and hustled off to federal court.148 There the court held that "collateral estoppel" did not require it to respect the state court's choice of law
determination.

1 49

Although one might argue that if state collateral estoppel law
would not have barred relitigation federal law also should not have, a
closer examination of the facts shows why a special interjurisdictional
preclusion doctrine might be necessary. The plaintiff, it is true, could
have refiled his action in state court after dismissal, just as the case was
refied in federal court. But states that are relatively tolerant of voluntary dismissal frequently provide structural protections that prevent
145
146
147
148
149

704 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
See id. at 218.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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dismissal from impairing the uniformity of their adjudicatory
processes. Such was the case here. The local rules of Dade County,
where Chan Tse Ming was filed, provided that the Presiding Judge
could reassign a previously nonsuited case to the judge before whom
the case was first filed. 150 Thus, if the plaintiff had refiled his case in
state court, he would probably have gotten the same judge, making it
quite likely that the choice of law ruling from the earlier proceeding
would have held good.
Such structural protections are not reflected on the federal side
of the dual court system, however. If the plaintiff in Chan Tse Ming
was allowed to refile in federal court, he would be guaranteed to get a
different judge-and one who was not bound by (and perhaps would
have no concern for) the preliminary rulings of the state court. The
case could not be precluded under federal law, because there had
been no final judgment; and the court could not abstain, because
there was no ongoing state proceeding. Only through the use of
Rooker-Feldman can federal law honor the state's avowed interest in
preserving the integrity of its judicial pronouncements.
Thus, there appears to be a place in which Rooker-Feldman might
do some work. That place is in cases in which a state plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a case in midstream and comes to federal court. If state
preclusion law would not bar the relitigation in state court, perhaps it
should not be barred in federal court either. But the further question
is whether the existence of a parallel federal court system creates an
interjurisdictional problem not resolved adequately by state law.
2.

Involuntary Plaintiffs

The easy mistake, however, is to assume that all plaintiff cases
should be barred: that conclusion is incorrect because not all state
plaintiffs are voluntay plaintiffs. Essential to the basis for excluding
state court plaintiffs is that they chose to litigate in state court instead
of federal court and then grew dissatisfied. Not all plaintiffs in state
court actually made that choice; some of them were forced for one
reason or another to litigate their case in the state courts, even though
they may in fact have preferred a federal forum.
The concept of the involuntary plaintiff is demonstrated by the
Third Circuit's decision in E.B. v. Verniero,151 a case challenging
Megan's Law. Megan's Law requires prosecutors to inform certain
150 See Morrison v. Morrison, 136 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Other
states make assignment of a previously dismissed case to the same judge mandatory.
See, e.g., TENN. R.30 DIsT. CT. R. 4.
151 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
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residents when a sex offender moves into their vicinity.' 52 Under
rules established by the NewJersey courts, before a prosecutor does so
he must provide notice of his intent to the convicted sex offender,
who then has a chance to challenge the prosecutorial action in state
court.153 E.B. went to state court, and then after the state court pro-

ceedings were complete, E.B. challenged the constitutionality of
54
Megan's Law in federal court.'
The Third Circuit incorrectly deemed E.B.'s federal action a "paradigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district
court from proceeding.' u5 5 If anything, E.B. was a paradigm preclusion
case in which the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine did no extra work. In order
to find that Rooker-Feldman was applicable, the Third Circuit ascertained that the New Jersey courts in fact were open to constitutional
challenges. 15 6 Thus, E.B.'s constitutional claims either were or should
have been brought in the state courts as part of the challenge to the
prosecutorial action. The state's finality interest, represented by preclusion doctrine, adequately resolves the case.
The problem of the involuntary plaintiff emerges from considering what options E.B. might have had in order to obtain federal review
and why federal review might have been justified. First, E.B. could
have filed a constitutional challenge to Megan's Law initially in federal court, and had he done so the suit unquestionably would have
proceeded. Adjudicating the constitutionality of this state statute
surely was within the federal interests in resolving federal law questions in federal courts and protecting federal rights. 157 The problem
is that it is unclear whether E.B. could also have gotten an adjudication of his state law claims in federal court. As a matter of law, the
Pennhurst doctrine might have barred such adjudication, 158 and as a
matter of state interest, obviously the state would have wished to litigate in state court the questions of which residents should have been
notified of E.B.'s status, and what form that notification should have
taken. Second, in order to obtain full adjudication, E.B. could have
split his claims between state and federal court, but then there would
152
153
154
155
156

See id. at 1081.
See id. at 1086.
See id. at 1087-88.
Id. at 1090-91.
See id. at 1091.

157 See supra note 113.
158

See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding

that the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when the state is the
real party in interest).
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have been the possibility of a rush to judgment by the state court in
159
order for that proceeding to have had preclusive effect.
In order to see why Rooker-Feldman should not have barred E.B.'s
action, it is instructive to understand that if E.B. had pursued one of
his other options (instead of filing only in state court), jurisdictional
doctrines relied upon by the lower courts would have permitted him
to obtain review of his federal claims. Although the decisions of the
courts of appeals are not unanimous, 160 for the most part they permit
federal plaintiffs in either of the two other circumstances to reserve
litigation of federal claims for federal court using the procedure
adopted in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners. Had
E.B. come to federal court with all his claims, the federal court may
well have sent him first to state court to adjudicate the state claims.16 1
If this had happened, however, E.B. likely could have used some variant of the England procedure to reserve his right to return to federal
court with his federal questions (should they not be mooted by the
state court judgment). 162 Similarly, if E.B. had split his claims, there
are some cases that suggest he still could have used the Englandprocedure to reserve his right to litigate his federal claims in federal
court.

163

The importance of this use of the England procedure cannot be
overstated. There are many cases in which plaintiffs have state claims
that cannot be litigated in federal court and federal claims they would
159 See, e.g., Beaver v. Bridwell, 598 F. Supp. 90 (D. Md. 1984) (holding that a state
disposition was res judicata to a federal suit even though plaintiff had bifurcated his
claims in accordance with Pennhurst).
160 Compare sources cited infra note 163, with Tarpley v. Salerno, 803 F.2d 57 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that England reservation applies only when there has been an
abstention by the federal court).
161 This could have been a result of either Pullman abstention, or a stay of the
federal action while the state claims were certified in the state's highest court. See
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (endorsing certification
of novel, unsettled questions of state law); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941) (endorsing federal court abstention on difficult questions of state law).
162 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (holding that a federal court litigant forced into state court because of Pullman abstention
may reserve the right to return to federal court).
163 See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 77 F.3d 1178
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a litigant may employ the England reservation procedure when forced to litigate in state court); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth.,
953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992) (allowing reservation when the would-be federal court
litigant is precluded from filing in federal court in the first instance, and is in state
court "involuntarily"); Delaware Valley Transplant Program v. Coye, 722 F. Supp. 1188
(D.N.J. 1989) (allowing reservation where Pennhurstwould not allow plaintiff to bring
entire suit in federal court).
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like to litigate in federal court. England solves this problem by permitting litigation of state claims in state court and federal claims in federal court.
If under any other scenario courts could reconcile competing
state and federal interests by dividing litigation between state and federal courts, why should matters be different for the truly involuntary
plaintiff? If E.B. was a voluntary state plaintiff, then that is precisely
when preclusionlaw should have applied to bar the federal suit.'6 4 But
if E.B. was an involuntary plaintiff in state court, then it is unclear why
Rooker-Feldmanshould have mandated dismissal of his action; although
state interests justify litigation of state claims in state court, there are
strong federal interests that support litigating federal questions in federal court. 165 These interests can be reconciled by using the England
procedure, and no court has specified any additional interest that
would justify applying Rooker-Feldman to bar federal litigation
Of course, once the federal plaintiff opts voluntarily to submit all
claims to the state courts, that ought to bar a subsequent federal suit
on Rooker-Feldman grounds even if preclusion does not apply. Thus
the federal court of appeals may have erred in Charchenko v. City of
Stillwater 66 in permitting federal review. In Charchenko, a former police officer brought a wrongful termination claim to state court, raising claims under state law and the federal Constitution. 167 The state
trial court dismissed the action, holding that it had no jurisdiction
either over the state law or federal law claims. 168 The federal appel164 E.B.'s lawyers may have erred by choosing to go to state court without reserving
E.B.'s intention to litigate federal claims in federal court, in which case E.B. might
have been a voluntary plaintiff. For example, E.B.'s attorneys may have believed that
New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine compelled them to bring all of their claims
in state court. The doctrine "prevents a litigant from asserting claims or suing parties
if those claims or parties could have been joined in a prior action involving that litigant and based on the same controversy." Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & LindaJ. Silberman, Inter'urisdictionalImplications of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J.
123, 123-24 (1996). At least one federal court has indicated that England reservation
applies even in view of the entire controversy doctrine. See Peduto v. City of N. Wildwood, 696 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D.N.J. 1988). If, however, in order to obtain full
adjudication, E.B. effectively were forced into state court with his federal claims, it is
not at all clear that Rooker-Feldman should have barred federal relitigation.
165 See Delaware Valley, 722 F. Supp. at 1199 (noting that "the interests of the states
in deciding issues of state law in the first instance, as well as the interests of the federal
government in allowing the federal courts to decide issues of federal constitutional
law, outweigh the inefficiencies of requiring the parties to litigate in each forum").
166 47 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 1995).
167 See id. at 982.
168 See id.
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late court held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the federal claim. 169 For
some reason difficult to fathom, the court of appeals then held that
170
Rooker-Feldman did bar the state law claims.
The relevant issue in Charchenkoshould have been whether there
was a state interest that would be served by the federal court respecting the work that had already been done by the state court in the case.
If so, that would seem equally true for the state and federal claims
posed by Charchenko. The district court noted correctly that the state
court's jurisdictional ruling as to the § 1983 claim may have been a
violation of federal law. 17 1 But, the state plaintiff simply could have

appealed the denial of state court jurisdiction over both claims
through the state system, and ultimately to the Supreme Court of the
United States. On the other hand, if the plaintiff were in state court
precisely because his state claims could not have been brought in federal court, the resolution should have been the same as in other cases
172
that have used the England procedure to permit split claims.
In the case of the involuntary plaintiff, therefore, Rooker-Feldman
should do no work. If a plaintiff is voluntarily in state court, federal
relitigation is inappropriate. But when a plaintiff is involuntarily in
state court because some other doctrine of federal jurisdiction forces
169 See id. at 984.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 983 n.2.
172 Another case like this is Kirby v. City of Philadelphia,905 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Pa.
1995). In Kirby, police officers who were retired because of disabilities sued in federal
court claiming a violation of their constitutional rights when they were denied certain
benefits. See id. at 224. The problem in Kirby was that pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the police claims had been arbitrated, and then the officers had
challenged the arbitration result in state court. See id. The district court held that it
had no jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. The key paragraph essentially is a non sequitur. The district court stated:
Had plaintiffs come initially to federal court [i.e., rather than challenging the arbitration result in state court], they would have been able to proceed with their case. However, under Pennsylvania state law the F[raternal]
0[rder of] P[olicel is required to enter arbitration with limited review in
state court, in the event of an employment dispute with the City. Plaintiffs
therefore have no right to bring this grievance to federal court.
Id. at 225-26 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). The Kirby court failed to see
that the federal plaintiffs might have had a choice of whether to file in federal court,
in which case preclusion rules might have governed a subsequent federal action. Alternatively, if they did not, then Rooker-Feldman should not have applied. The state
may have an interest in having such arbitration decisions reviewed in some way in its
courts, but there is also a federal interest in having the federal challenges brought in
federal court. If the England procedure can be used to solve this problem in the
preclusion context, why not in the Rooker-Feldman context?
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her there to obtain full adjudication, federal courts properly use the
England procedure to avoid the preclusive effect of prior state litigation and thus preserve the federal forum for the adjudication of federal claims. Rooker-Feldman sometimes is used to bar federal litigation
in these cases, but it is unclear why. Given the absence of a clear interest advanced by Rooker-Feldmanin these cases, the doctrine should not
be used to bar federal jurisdiction.
D. Administrative Parties
We treat administrative cases separately here not because they are
different than other cases, but because they are not. What we mean
by administrative cases are those cases that begin in a state administrative agency and then find their way into federal court. The problem
of administrative review has caused some difficulty for courts in applying doctrines such as preclusion and Younger. What we hope to show
is that the same rules developed in the cases of state plaintiffs and
defendants ought to apply in administrative proceedings as well.
We separate out administrative cases because the distinction emphasizes that the decision in the Feldman case itself is deeply problematic. As will be evident momentarily, Feldman was a garden-variety
administrative case, one in which the federal plaintiff was an involuntary state administrative plaintiff. Other doctrines of federal jurisdiction suggest that there should be federal review available in such
cases. Working from the bottom up, Rooker-Feldman does some work
under the first precondition-it serves to bar federal review where
other doctrines would not-but it perhaps should not under the second precondition. The ironic result of Feldman is that lawyers and
judges in licensing and disciplinary cases receive less process due
them than any other individuals or entities in similar circumstances
receive.
1. Administrative Defendants
Most administrative defendant cases are easy. Rooker-Feldman
does no work in these cases. Just like civil or criminal defendants,
these administrative defendants arguably have violated state law.
Thus, the state interest justifies deference to state litigation. If state
administrative defendants lose before the administrative tribunal,
then they usually can, and therefore likely must, seek review through
the state system. In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
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Schools, Inc., 17 3

the Supreme Court held that Youngerwould bar federal
court suits in the face of ongoing administrative proceedings and suggested that review of such decisions in the state system was appropriate. In University of Tennessee v. Elliott,174 the Supreme Court held that
so long as they comport with due process, administrative proceedings
obtain the preclusive effect in federal court that state law would grant
them. More important, an administrative judgment pursued through
the state court system is just like any other, and preclusive effect will
attach to it. Again, in these cases, just as in the other defendant cases,
Rooker-Feldman will not do any work.
2.

Administrative Plaintiffs

Administrative plaintiff cases tend to confuse courts. These administrative cases have proven difficult for federal courts grappling
with other doctrines like Younger and preclusion. 175 But there need
not be any confusion insofar as Rooker-Feldman is concerned. If the
plaintiff is not voluntarily in state court, then a way should be found to
permit litigation of federal claims in federal court. As will be evident,
administrative plaintiffs are by nature involuntary plaintiffs.
The Rooker-Feldman problem following administrative proceedings is evident in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Centres v. Town of
Brookfield.176 In Centres, the federal plaintiffs sought a building permit
before the appropriate state bodies. 177 When the permit was denied,
they next sought review in state court.1 78 However, when the plaintiffs
lost their option to build on the property, the state litigation was abandoned and the plaintiffs came to federal court with state and federal
173 477 U.S. 619 (1986). In the Dayton Christian Schools Case, a parochial school
terminated the employment of a teacher who had become pregnant. The teacher
filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, alleging sex discrimination
in violation of state law. While the administrative proceeding was pending, the school
responded with a § 1983 action requesting an injunction on First Amendment
grounds. The Supreme Court ordered Younger abstention, saying "it is sufficient...
that constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceeding." Id. at 629.
174 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
175 CompareAlleghany Corp. v. Haase, 896 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to
abstain on Younger grounds when plaintiff sued in federal court after being denied a
permit by a state commission), vacated sub nom. Dillon v. Alleghany Corp., 499 U.S.
933 (1991), with Alleghany Corp. v. Pomeroy, 898 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1990)
(abstaining).
176 148 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998).
177 See id. at 700.
178 See id. at 701.
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claims.17 9 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court decision
that Rooker-Feldman barred the action. The court applied that circuit's
quite peculiar guideline that " [i]f the federal plaintiff was the plaintiff
in state court, he must contend with res judicata; if the federal plaintiff was the defendant in state court, he must contend with the RookerFeldman doctrine." 180 Applying its rule, the Seventh Circuit held that
res judicata, not Rooker-Feldman, was at issue; it then failed to do any
resjudicata analysis and dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim
on which relief could be granted. 18 1
The Centres court actually might have stumbled onto the right result in that case, given that no state interest would justify applying
Booker-Feldmanwhere the federal proceeding concerns a question that
was not at issue before the state court. The Centres plaintiffs dropped
the state court suit because they had lost their option to build. The
federal suit was for damages from that loss and it is arguable that the
state's interest in litigating the case in state court had evaporated and
182
the federal court could have reached the merits.
Even if Centres had still been pursuing the building permit in
state court, federal review nonetheless should have remained available. At bottom, the permissibility of federal review hinges on
whether Centres was voluntarily in state court. It probably was not.
179 See id. at 700, 701.
180 Id. at 702.
181 See id. at 703-05.
182 It is of course correct that the state has no valid interest in litigating claims that
were not properly part of the initial state administrative proceeding. In Dale v. Moore,
121 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), the plaintiff brought a federal suit under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, complaining of a position the state bar of Florida
took toward his fitness for the bar during proceedings in the state court. The plaintiff
was admitted to the bar, but still sought damages in the federal action. See id. at 625.
The Eleventh Circuit held the ADA claim barred on Rooker-Feldman grounds, finding
that the federal action would require it to examine the propriety of the same Florida
bar rules and facts at issue in the state proceeding. See id. at 627. Moreover, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could have brought his claim in state court.
See id. It is highly implausible, however, that Florida would have litigated a damages
claim in the course of the bar proceeding, the Eleventh Circuit's odd perspective on
the case notwithstanding. Given that plaintiff's ADA damage claim likely would not
have been entertained in the course of the Florida disciplinary proceeding, Florida
had no interest that would justify applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar federal
litigation. (It would have been a preclusion question anyway. Another way to think
about the Eleventh Circuit's decision is to ask this question. Suppose that Florida
declined to adjudicate the ADA damages claim as part of the bar proceeding. Would
that have violated Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), or would the limited jurisdiction
in bar proceedings cases have adequately justified refusing to hear the federal claim?
Again, the answer seems apparent: there would have been no Testa problem.)
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Given the pervasive regulation of many areas by the state-such as
land use, at issue in Centres-partieshave no choice but to come to the
state agency for what they seek. The hard question is what ought to
happen next.
Federal courts are split as to whether abstention rules will bar
administrative plaintiffs from coming to federal court following a loss
before the state agency, but the better-reasoned view seems to be that
immediate federal review is appropriate. 183 After all, these plaintiffs
have not violated state law, so it is difficult to see what state interest
justifies denying them federal review.1 84 Moreover, barring federal review here creates troubling incentives. In administrative cases where
the claim is that the state rule itself is unconstitutional, the lack of an
exhaustion requirement in § 1983 cases means the administrative
plaintiff simply will skip the state agency altogether if filing there and
losing means being forever barred from federal court. It is unclear
why the result should differ simply because the agency decision itself
allegedly violates the federal Constitution, or confirms that the state
rule is in fact unconstitutional. Finally, there is no reason, to the extent there are state interests, that the federal court could not take
jurisdiction, send the plaintiff to state court to fulfill the state interests, and use the England procedure to permit the plaintiff to reserve
litigation of the federal claims in federal court should that prove
necessary.
To the extent that state administrative plaintiffs are treated like
involuntary plaintiffs, Rooker-Feldman will not do any additional work
in these cases, a point made clear by Narey v. Dean.'8 5 In Narey, a state
employee was demoted and filed a challenge in the appropriate administrative body.18 6 He then lost in that body and filed an action in
state court, which he subsequently dismissed voluntarily, without prejudice.' 8 7 After the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action, the state argued
183 Much of this reasoning is employed by Judge Posner in Alleghany Corp. v.
Haase,896 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom. Dillon v. Alleghany Corp., 499
U.S. 933 (1991). For a contrary view, see Alleghany Corp. v. Pomeroy, 898 F.2d 1314
(8th Cir. 1990).
184 The cases cited above deal primarily with Younger abstention in this context.
There still may be a preclusion problem under University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S.
788 (1986), although states often will not afford preclusive effect to agency determinations of constitutional questions that were or could have been raised before the
agency. See, e.g., Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 456
(Tenn. 1995) (holding that failure to raise a constitutional challenge during an
agency proceeding does not preclude consideration of the challenge by the courts).
185 32 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1994).
186 See id. at 1522-23.
187 See id. at 1523.
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Rooker-Feldman.'8 8 The Eleventh Circuit in this case held quite properly that Rooker-Feldman, "unlike ... res judicata,applies only to state
court decisions, not to state administrative decisions."18 9 That makes
sense because, unless the state either (1) advances an interest in the
finality of that decision, which preclusion rules govern; 190 or (2) advances an interest in uniformity of review of those decisions, which the
Burford abstention doctrine would cover, 19 1 there is no additional interestjustifying application of Rooker-Feldman. In short, Rooker-Feldman
does no work.
3.

Feldman, Attorneys, and Judges

The problem is that the result in Narey appears to be inconsistent
with the outcome of Feldman itself. If the state's administrative decision can be challenged in federal court in Narey, why can't the administrative decision at issue in Feldman be challenged similarly? The
answer must be that (1) Feldman is wrong; or (2) the "inextricably
intertwined"/"general challenge" rule must be interpreted to follow
the contours of what the England procedure would preserve; or (3)
Feldman is distinguishable.
An optimistic reading of the Feldman decision might suggest that
it comports with. the analysis thus far. Recall that in Feldman, the
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could pursue "general challenges"
192
but not claims inextricably intertwined with the state proceedings.
In its own awkward way this distinction does try to mimic the result of
using the England procedure following administrative proceedings to
preserve judicial review.19 3 Application of Englandwould send to state
court any state claims, but it would preserve for federal review any
federal claims. Feldman goes a bit further in limiting federal review,
but perhaps not much further. It denies the federal courtjurisdiction
over the state claim (bar admission; decision not to waive the bar
188 See id.
189 Id.at 1525.
190 See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986) (holding that
the traditional purposes of preclusion are "equally implicated whether factfinding is
done by a federal or state agency").
191 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 326 (1943) (abstaining to "prevent
the confusion of multiple review of the same general issues").
192 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83
(1983).
193 See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 77 F.3d 1178
(9th Cir. 1996) (allowing plaintiff to reserve federal claims after adverse decision by
state agency); Delaware Valley Transplant Program v. Coye, 722 F. Supp. 1188 (D.N.J.
1989) (same).
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rule), as well as any specific challenge on constitutional grounds to
the applicant's own result. 19 4 On the other hand, all other federal
claims are permissible.
It takes some real optimism to reach this conclusion, however. A
far more likely conclusion is that, odd as it sounds, Feldman itself
flunks the bottom-up test by allowing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to
do some work when it should not. Feldman was an involuntary administrative plaintiff. As we have seen, preclusion doctrine and Younger
would not forbid federal review, nor should they.195 Rooker-Feldman
errs to the extent it mandates otherwise.
In order to get a clear understanding of why Feldman is wrong, it
is useful to turn for a moment to Feldman's partner cases, those involving the disciplining of judges and attorneys. These are administrative
defendant cases, of course. The judges and lawyers are accused of
violating state regulatory or even criminal rules. As we have seen,
Rooker-Feldman does no work in these cases; 196 they are adequately
handled by the Younger and preclusion doctrines.
All too often when Rooker-Feldman is employed in administrative
defendant cases, it serves to deny defendants a forum when the other
doctrines arguably would permit federal review. In Guarino v. Larsen,19 7 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court removed a trial
judge from hearing cases because of alleged misconduct dealing with
jurors. Rather than use its procedure for removing judges from office, however, the state supreme court simply relied on its discretionary authority over the assignment of cases. 198 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did issue a "show cause" notice to the judge "defendant," but he declined to appear precisely because he feared that
Rooker-Feldman would then bar a federal action. 199 The Third Circuit
held that despite the administrative appearance of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision, the "show cause" order converted it to a
judicial" proceeding.2 ° °
Rooker-Feldman seems to be doing some work in Guarino, but it is
far less clear that this work meets the second precondition of our test.
It is difficult to believe that state preclusion law would justify barring
the federal suit on account of the discretionary ruling of the Penn194
195
196

See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-83.
See supra Part III.D.2.
See supra Part III.D.1.

197 11 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1993).
198
199
200

See id. at 1152.
See id. at 1155.
See id.at 1160.
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sylvania Supreme Court.20 1 If Rooker-Feldman would bar a federal action that would survive other doctrines, we need to identify a state or
federal interest being served. Surely there is a state interest in conducting attorney and judicial discipline autonomously, 20 2 but it is diffi-

cult to conclude such an interest would trump the federal interest in
having constitutional claims regarding such cases resolved in federal
court, or at least in somejudicial proceeding. The problem in Guarino
is that the judicial nature of the proceeding was dubious at best, as was
any conclusion that the "show cause" process as to the use of discretionary power would have met due process concerns. Due process requires some adequate hearing, 203 and it is questionable whether that
occurred in Guarino.
The Third Circuit realized a possible difficulty with its decision, a
difficulty that actually pervades these cases of attorney and judge discipline. In a footnote, the Third Circuit stated that "when a court
makes a decision concerning the legality of its own actions, it may be
too biased to justify abstention by the federal courts even if its acts are
considered adjudicative." 20 4 The court further stated that application
of this principle to Rooker-Feldmanwas an open question, and a troubling one as it appeared to be in tension with Feldman itself.20 5 Nonetheless, the court determined that it could duck the question because
20 6
the federal plaintiff had not raised the issue.

The concern about bias identified by the Third Circuit in Guarino, however, is inherent in any administrative scheme in which the
administering body also is part of the state judicial system, and particularly so when the administrative body is the state supreme court.
201 Pennsylvania preclusion law requires a "final judgment on the merits." Balent
v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 315 (Pa. 1995).
202 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16 (noting the strength of state interest in regulating state bar); Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 745 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that
regulating lawyer conduct is a fundamentally important state interest); see also Helen
Hershkoff, PositiveRights and State Constitutions: The Limits of FederalRationalityReview,
112 H- v.L. REV. 1131, 1166 (1999) (rooting the federal courts' "hands-off" attitude
toward such inherently local issues in a theory of dual sovereignty that assumes that
states and localities are normatively superior to the national government in dealing
with the "everyday stuff of life").
203 Cf In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right
to his day in court-are basic in our system ofjurisprudence; and these rights include,
as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to
be represented by counsel.").
204 Guarino, 11 F.3d at 1159 n.4.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 1160.
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The possibility of a due process problem is rampant in these disciplinary cases. 20 7 For example, in Leaf v. Supreme Court,208 an attorney was
subjected to a disciplinary proceeding. The plaintiff raised both constitutional challenges to the procedures being used to discipline her
20 9
It
and challenges claiming bias and conspiracy in prosecuting her.

may well be, as the Seventh Circuit stated, that Leaf s constitutional
claims "push the bounds of reason and credibility."2 10 Even so, there
is reason to wonder how a court so accused can adjudicate such claims
in a neutral fashion. This is not to say every accusation of bias by a
defendant should result in recusal of the judging court. Based on the
description of the case, the proceeding and its outcome against the
attorney may have beenjustified. But in attorney and judge discipline
cases, the quarters are a bit too close for comfort.
These cases are basically administrative review cases without any
judicial review. It is common to have the state's highest court serve as
the licensing authority for lawyers and the disciplinary body for attorneys andjudges. 21 ' Yet, it is difficult to be a regulator and still adjudicate the same cases in a way that comports with due process. In these
cases, no judicial review occurs in a body separate from the state's
highest court's exercise of its regulatory function (except the remote
possibility of obtaining a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court).
The problem is exacerbated by an apparent zeal on the part of
federal judges to defer to the decisions of their state colleagues, leading to application of Rooker-Feldman in situations in which it cannot
possibly be justified. Such was the case in Edmonds v. Clarkson,2 12 another judicial discipline case. In Edmonds, the state trial judge had
launched an investigation into possible misconduct of colleagues toward bail bonding agents. 2 13 The case is not clear precisely on the
underlying issues, but it appears that the trial judge was African-American, and that there might have been (among other things) a claim of
some discrimination in treatment of bonding agents.
207

21 4

Cf Larry Kramer, The Constitution as Architecture: A Charette,65

Subsequently
IND.

L.J. 283, 287

(1990) (noting that the ability to decide policy and to control its implementation in
particular cases seriously threatens individual rights and liberty).
208

979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1992).

209
210

See id. at 594.
Id. at 602.

211

See Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that supervision

of bar and particularly attorney discipline is traditionally the sole responsibility of the
state supreme court).
212 996 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1998).

213
214

See id. at 543.
See id.
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the judge was charged in a disciplinary proceeding. 215 Further complicating matters, one basis for the disciplinary proceeding was an accusation that the judge was having an affair with one of the bonding
21 6
agents who appeared before him in a forfeiture proceeding.
It is difficult to justify the application of Rooker-Feldman in Edmonds because he resigned (rather than go through the disciplinary
hearing) and then filed suit in federal court.2 17 Since the judge removed himself from the purview of the state regulatory authority, the
state's interest in having the federal proceeding stopped seemed entirely nonexistent. The Edmonds court held the case barred by RookerFeldman based on the "strong state interest in regulating the conduct
of the state judiciary, ' 21 8 but if Edmonds was not ajudge anymore, the
basis for a regulatoryproceeding is unclear. It is true that one type of
2 19
relief requested in the federal action was reinstatement as a judge;
perhaps the federal court should not mandate that relief, instead
reaching judgment on the claims for money damages alone. 22 0 But
the facts of the case raise troubling questions about the ability of the
state judiciary to resolve the case fairly.
The solution to all this is to remove the attorney disciplinary process from the state supreme courts. It may well be that lawyers and
judges should play a role in self-regulation. But the problem with applying Rooker-Feldmanin these cases is that inevitably the procedures of
the regulatory forum are going to be called into question. At least if
there was review of these claims through a court system not involved
with the disciplinary proceedings themselves, the state interest in respecting those proceedings would be clearer. When the state's highest court is the regulatory body, however, application of RookerFeldman usually means there will be no independent judicial review.
Although Feldman is a bar admission case, and not a disciplinary
case, this reasoning does call Feldman into question as well. It should.
Feldman was an involuntary state plaintiff denied access to federal
court on the basis of the state proceeding. Both doctrinal distinctions
made by the Supreme Court in Feldman are in fact problematic. First,
Feldman might have seemed a judicial proceeding to the court, but it
actually was administrative. Justice Stevens made this point in dis215

See id. at 544.

216

See id.

217 See id.
218 Id. at 551.
219 See id. at 544.
220 Cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468 (1991) (noting that "the states'
power to define the qualifications of their officeholders has force even as against the
proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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22 1

and it is obvious he was correct. Although Feldman's complaint followed action by the District of Columbia's highest "court," in
a sense that was but a coincidence. If he was a doctor or a dentist with
the same complaint, the structure of the case would have been precisely like that in Centres- party asks state agency for administrative ruling; agency denies party's request; party comes to (state or federal)
court to complain. It is just happenstance that when the applicant is a
lawyer, the administrative agency in many states is also the highest
court. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court's holding that the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' ruling was 'Judicial" in nature
is so very awkward.
Even more problematic is that the "inextricably intertwined"/
"general challenge" distinction is impossible to understand as employed in Feldman. Recall that in Feldman the Supreme Court held
that Feldman's "general" constitutional claim could be raised in federal court. But this makes no sense. In order to see this, compare
Feldman to Facio. Facio was the case in which a defendant who had a
default judgment entered against him tried to challenge the state
court rule governing defaults. 2 22 The federal plaintiff in Facio argued
that his challenge to the constitutionality of the state law was a general
challenge; the court, with one judge dissenting, held that the claim
was inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.223 The
majority seems correct. But how could it be that Facio's constitutional
claims were inextricably intertwined, when Feldman's (and the Kiowa
Tribe's, for that matter) were not? After all, Feldman and the Kiowa
Tribe raised in state court the very claims they sought to litigate in
federal court. Facio did not. No sensible meaning of the words "inextricably intertwined" justifies these results.
The difficulty with interpreting "inextricably intertwined" has led
some courts and commentators to conclude that sense can be made of
the "inextricably intertwined" standard by applying a standing test.
This is a good attempt, but the argument does not work. The Facio
court stated:
sent,

[T] he two forms of relief [the general challenge to the state law and
the pendent claim to have the default overturned] are so intertwined, in fact, that if Mr. Facio is not able to set aside the default
judgment against him, he would lack standing to assert his second
221 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 489 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (saying that the court "performed no more and no less than
the administrative function of a licensing board").
222 See generally Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1991).
223 See id. at 545.
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claim, which is the request that the federal court declare Utah's de2 24
fault judgment procedures unconstitutional.
But the very same thing was true in Feldman.225 The argument in
Feldman would be that the federal plaintiff had standing and thus his
challenge was "general" and not "inextricably intertwined" because he
could reapply for admission. However, it is nothing but unhelpful formal reasoning to say Feldman could reapply. Feldman was not getting
into the District of Columbia bar until the rule he claimed was unconstitutional was struck down. This is perfectly analogous to Facio's
case. In both cases, the parties would prevail on the claim that really
mattered if they won their federal action.
The only administrative cases in which Rooker-Feldmanseems to do
any work are licensing and disciplinary proceedings involving judges
and lawyers. Involuntary administrative plaintiffs either have, or
should have, their choice of a federal or state judicial forum. Even in
case involving administrative defendants, there is at least full review of
those proceedings in an independent state judicial system. But Feldman condemned lawyers and judges to less federal review than any
other state administrative party, including other state professional
licensees. This result is difficult to justify.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The analysis that led us here was complex, but the conclusion is
rather stunning. The one place that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
might appropriately do some work is the very instance in which lower
courts have stretched the doctrine beyond the Rocker and Feldman
cases themselves, depriving the doctrine of its rationale. Rooker-Feld224

Id.

225

Suzanna Sherry distinguishes bar admission from bar discipline cases in terms

of standing. See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1108-11. She argues bar discipline defendants lack standing to challenge bar rules because they cannot show they would be
disciplined again. See id&at 1110. But admission candidates, she asserts, can apply
again and do have standing. See id. As we see with Feldman, however, this may be a

distinction without a difference relevant to the state interests. Feldman may reapply,
but he will not get in unless the rule he challenged in the stateproceedingis struck down.
How can that not be "inextricably intertwined"?
The plaintiff/defendant distinction helps us see that there is a way to distinguish
the bar admission and bar discipline cases by relying on party status rather than standing. Bar applicants are plaintiffs, but they are essentially involuntary plaintiffs. Bar
discipline cases involve defendants in which the state rule arguably already has been
broken. As we previously have seen in other contexts, defendants get treated differently than involuntary plaintiffs. ComparePart III.B, with Part III.C.2. Plaintiffs forced
into state court, if they follow the proper procedures, should be able to reserve their

federal claims.
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man sensibly operates to plug any gap in the Younger and preclusion
doctrines when a party who could have chosen to litigate in federal
court instead chooses state court and then in the course of litigation
becomes unhappy with that decision. For the most part this applies to
state plaintiffs, but as the Zobel case makes clear, it also might apply to
a state defendant who could have removed the action but did not.
On the other hand, the one clear place in which Rooker-Feldman
seems troubling is in the very circumstances in which the doctrine
developed-lawyer and judge licensing and regulatory proceedings.
This would not necessarily be the case if those licensing and disciplinary boards were structured like the administrative boards that regulate other professions. But regulation by the state's highest court asks
that body to serve as both regulator and judge. Due process suggests
the problem with this approach.
Thus, our conclusion is simple. Feldman should be overruled,
and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is going to have to be renamed or
abandoned. It might serve an important gap-filling role with regard to
voluntary state plaintiffs, at least so long as state preclusion law does
not. Federal courts ought to be reluctant to provide a forum for shipjumping by state plaintiffs; state law may not accommodate this interest because it results from the interjurisdictional problem arising from
the existence of federal courts.

